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INTRODUCTION 
President Barack Obama’s 2008 election victory marked a 
paradigm shift in U.S. political history.  For the first time, an 
American presidential campaign focused its efforts on new 
technology and the Internet.1  In the months leading up to Election 
Day, the Obama campaign utilized several web-based applications, 
including Facebook, Myspace, and YouTube, to raise money, 
spread his political platforms, and, most importantly, establish a 
formidable base of young supporters.2 
After being elected, President Obama continued to employ the 
technology-based tactics that had proven so useful during his 
campaign.  Remnants of an antiquated system began to move out, 
and a surge of technology-based systems emerged.  The most 
prominent change was the creation of two new administrative 
positions, the Chief Technology Officer (“CTO”) and the Chief 
Information Officer (“CIO”).  Their primary roles are to create 
changes to more efficiently utilize technology throughout 
government3 and to oversee the government’s extensive 
technological infrastructure, which includes twelve thousand major 
Information Technology systems and the hundreds of thousands of 
databases behind those systems.4  As these databases host 
countless confidential federal documents, the officers’ 
responsibilities cannot be understated. 
On December 9, 2010, Vivek Kundra, President Obama’s 
choice to serve as the nation’s first CIO, mandated that all 
 
 1 Matthew Fraser & Soumitra Dutta, Barack Obama and the Facebook Election, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/ 
11/19/barack-obama-and-the-facebook-election (“[Obama] will be the first occupant of 
the White House to have won a presidential election on the Web.”). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Technology, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2013 2:25 PM). 
 4 Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & Procurement Reform of the H. 
Comm. On Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Vivek 
Kundra, Federal Chief Information Officer, Office of Management and Budget) 
[hereinafter Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems]. 
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government agencies “shift to [the] ‘Cloud First’ policy.”5  Most 
government agencies began this process by sharing their data with 
private corporations that offer Internet storage opportunities or 
cloud computing services.6  Naturally, whenever the government 
changes the way in which it performs its daily business, those who 
work in government begin to recognize risks that may have been 
given little thought before the plan was implemented.  In 2011, 
Vivek Kundra wrote in an op-ed article in the New York Times that 
“[o]ne of the critical remaining issues concerning cloud computing 
is whether cloud data can and should flow between nations and 
what restrictions should be placed upon it.”7  Although the 
motivation exists, and the financial resources are available to begin 
the transition, these security and privacy issues have not been 
resolved. 
As the government increasingly relies on cloud computing 
technology to provide storage and perform computing tasks, voices 
from across the industry have raised concern over how these data 
servers will remain secure, governed, and protected.  On May 25, 
2011, Representative Sheila Jackson Lee remarked at a hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition, 
and the Internet that “the current trend of technology is to place 
information onto the cloud of third party operating systems and 
allows phones and computers to access this information. . . . [H]ow 
will the Government address jurisdictional issues?  I don’t want to 
ask about the Government, but what are you all doing with respect 
to that concept?”8  These voices will continue to be heard as the 
 
 5 VIVEK KUNDRA, THE WHITE HOUSE, 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN TO REFORM 
FEDERAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT (2010), available at 
https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/25-Point-Implementation-Plan-
to-Reform-Federal-IT.pdf [hereinafter 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].  Steven 
VanRoekel, a former Microsoft executive, replaced Kundra as the new U.S. CIO on 
August 5, 2011 and remained dedicated to the 25 Point Plan. See Steven VanRoekel, 
Shocking the System Through IT Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 7, 2012, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/07/shocking-system-through-it-reform 
(discussing the successes of the Plan since its inception). 
 6 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 7 Vivek Kundra, Tight Budget? Look to the “Cloud,” N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/tightbudget-look-to-the-cloud.html?_r=1&. 
 8 Cybersecurity: Innovative Solutions to Challenging Problems: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. On 
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United States and its private data become “virtual” without 
concrete plans for protecting the security of our information. 
Further, the location of data storage often has choice-of-law 
implications.  If a data sever replicates one’s information for 
safekeeping, multiple countries may have concurrent jurisdiction 
over the data server and subsequent legal disputes can occur. 
This is not the first time in history that the government has 
been involved in jurisdictional challenges related to location and 
data security.  After September 11, 2001, a United States program 
run by the Central Intelligence Agency and overseen by the 
Department of the Treasury used financial records to track and 
review the suspicious transactions of individuals suspected of 
having ties with Al Qaeda.9  These international bank transactions 
were processed through the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”), a Belgian cooperative.10  
“SWIFT operated two redundant data centers—one in the United 
States and one in the Netherlands,” governed respectively by 
American and European law.11  The Department of the Treasury 
exerted jurisdiction over all of SWIFT’s data through its authority 
over the U.S. center.12 
The Treasury program was publicly disclosed in 2006, leading 
many Europeans to claim that “American access to European 
banking data violated European data privacy laws.”13  “European 
authorities compelled SWIFT to bifurcate [the] data storage, 
keeping European data exclusively on the Netherlands [sic] server” 
so as to subject the data to European privacy regulation.14 
 
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 85 (2011) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, H. 
Comm. On the Judiciary). 
 9 See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block 
Terror, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/23/washington/ 
23intel.html?pagewanted=1. 
 10 See id. 
 11 Michael Chertoff, Data Sovereignty in the Cloud: The Issues for Government, 
SAFEGOV (Nov. 1, 2011), http://safegov.org/2011/11/1/data-sovereignty-in-the-cloud-the-
issues-for-government. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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As one can see, the location of data storage often implicates 
choice-of-law considerations.  If a data server replicates one’s 
information for safekeeping, multiple countries may have 
concurrent jurisdiction over the data server and subsequent legal 
disputes can occur. 
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I introduces cloud 
computing technology, the U.S. government’s move to cloud 
computing, the present state of U.S. jurisdictional law, and 
international regulations governing data and privacy.  Part II 
examines how international regulations governing cloud 
computing technology differ from regulations in the United States.  
Part II also illustrates several conflicts that could arise if the United 
States does not increase its regulation of the cloud computing 
industry.  Finally, Part III proposes two solutions to achieve 
security while the U.S. government moves to cloud computing.  
The government should either maintain data centers on its own 
property and contract out its technological needs, or else adopt a 
cohesive regulatory system that emulates the European Union’s by 
requiring that government data be maintained domestically, even if 
not specifically on government owned property. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides a background for understanding how cloud 
computing raises jurisdictional questions, thereby affecting control 
and access to data.  Part I.A discusses the history and current 
infrastructure of cloud computing technology.  Part I.B explains 
the U.S. government’s shift to cloud computing technology.  Part 
I.C explores the effect of U.S. jurisdictional law on cloud 
computing, while Part I.D discusses the international approach to 
regulating data. 
A.  What’s in a Name: The Present State of Cloud Computing 
1. The Definition and History of Cloud Computing 
“Cloud computing” is a misnomer.  On its face, the term 
“cloud” suggests that when a user composes an e-mail and clicks 
“send,” the e-mail floats up and is stored somewhere in the sky.  In 
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reality, the opposite is true.  While satellites often transmit data for 
the purposes of cloud computing, technology companies that offer 
cloud computing services store and process data on the ground in 
massive “server farms.”15  These server farms contain hundreds of 
thousands of individual servers.16  When a user accesses data 
stored on a server, it is referred to as using cloud computing 
technology.17 
The term “cloud computing” was first developed in the 1960s 
when corporations used a cloud symbol to represent the Internet 
during business meetings.18  However, it was not publicly used to 
describe an approach to data storage until August 2006 when 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt first publicly used the term at a search 
engine conference in San Jose, California.19  According to a news 
report by NBC, this may have been an early start to the Google-
Amazon “Internet wars,” as Schmidt may have been trying to pre-
empt Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud system, which was 
released that same month.20 
Cloud computing can be defined as a “computing model” used 
to deliver information technology and computing services through 
the Internet,21 to store data, or to offer services such as virtual 
 
 15 Paul T. Jaeger, Jimmy Lin, Justin M. Grimes, & Shannon N. Simmons, Where is the 
Cloud? Geography, Economics, Environment, and Jurisdiction in Cloud Computing, 14 
FIRST MONDAY 1, § 4 (2009), available at http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/ 
index.php/fm/article/view/2456/2171. 
 16 Id.  While larger companies, such as Amazon and Google, are able to maintain their 
own server farms, “[m]any companies rent space in shared (or ‘co-location’) centers 
belonging to” larger companies. Not a Cloud in Sight, ECONOMIST (Oct. 27, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21565003-best-places-store-your- 
terabytes-not-cloud-sight. 
 17 See Mark Koba, Cloud Computing: CNBC Explains, CNBC (June 29, 2011, 11:30 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43483060/Cloud_Computing_CNBC_Explains (“In 
simplest terms, cloud computing involves delivering hosted services over the Internet. 
The service end is where the data or software is stored and the user end is a single person 
or company network.”). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Vivek Kundra, Streaming at 1:00: In the Cloud, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 15, 
2009, 12:09 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/streaming-at-100-in-the-cloud. 
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desktops, which allow remote access to data.22  Before cloud 
computing, a computer could only run software that was installed 
on its hard drive, and a computer’s capabilities were limited to the 
data and processing power contained therein.23  For example, in the 
1990s, users who wanted to use the AOL Instant Messenger 
(“AIM”) application were required to install software from a CD 
onto their computers to access the application.24 
Cloud computing has revolutionized how users interact with 
software by allowing a computer to serve as simply the front-end 
portal, an access point through which users access software and 
data on remote servers.  Today’s version of AIM—Google Chat, 
the instant message feature of Google’s Gmail—does not require 
users to load or download software; instead, the program initiates 
once a user accesses the program through Gmail.25  Among other 
advantages of cloud computing, users can access vastly larger 
stores of data and greater processing power through cloud 
computing than their personal computers would otherwise allow.26 
2. Daily Interactions with Cloud Computing 
In this age of robust technology, a majority of the U.S. 
population has used cloud computing in one way or another.27  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2011 Current Population 
Survey, seventy-eight percent of American adults use the 
 
 22 Richard Spires, Cloud Computing, Front and Center, CIOC BLOG (Sept. 6, 2011), 
https://cio.gov/cloud-computing-front-and-center. 
 23 See Michael Miller, Cloud Computing Pros and Cons for End Users, QUE 
PUBLISHING (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.quepublishing.com/articles/article.aspx 
?p=1324280. 
 24 See Burn-Your-Own-AOL-CD, AOL HELP, http://help.aol.com/help/microsites/ 
search.do?cmd=displayKC&externalId=223798#fourth (“The AOL Installer CD is no 
longer available at a retail store . . . .”). 
 25 About Chatting in Gmail, GOOGLE, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/chat.html (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 26 See Miller, supra note 23; see also JOHN VILLASENOR, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY 
INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, ADDRESSING EXPORT CONTROL IN THE AGE OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 1 (Christine Jacobs ed., 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0725_cloud_computing_villasenor/0725_cloud_computing_v
illasenor.pdf. 
 27 The PC Generation: Computer Use, 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), 
http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/2000/chap10.pdf. 
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Internet.28  This often requires interfacing with cloud computing 
technology.  Any AOL, Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, or Gmail user has 
interacted with cloud computing technology.29  Further, each of the 
300 million photographs uploaded to Facebook every day 
represents an interaction with cloud computing technology.30  
Industry research predicts that the cloud computing market will 
swell to a $241 billion industry by 2020.31 
Cloud computing services can be broken down into three main 
service models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a 
Service (IaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS).32  SaaS includes 
blogs, applications available on a smartphone or tablet,33 and any 
software that can be accessed through a web browser, such as 
Email as a Service (EaaS).34  SaaS powers all of Google’s 
 
 28 See Adult Computer and Adult Internet Users by Selected Characteristics: 2000 to 
2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/ 
tables/12s1158.pdf; see also Digital Nation: Expanding Internet Usage, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. (2011), available at http://www.ntia. 
doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_internet_use_report_february_2011.pdf (“As a group, 
an estimated 209 million Americans—about 72 percent of all adults and children ages 
three years and older—use the Internet somewhere, whether it be at home, the workplace, 
schools, libraries, or a neighbor’s house.”). 
 29 See, e.g., Aaron Lake & Jacob Rosenberg, You’ve Got . . . AOL Cloud Computing, 
UPTIME INSTITUTE, http://symposium.uptimeinstitute.com/advanced-search/1234-youve-
got-aol-cloud-computing (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 30 See Loek Essers, Facebook to Use ‘Cold Storage’ to Deal with Vast Amounts of 
Data, INFOWORLD (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-
computing/facebook-use-cold-storage-deal-vast-amounts-of-data-205127. 
 31 Forrester Forecasts USD 241 Billion Cloud Computing Market By 2020, 
INFORMATION WEEK (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.informationweek.in/Cloud_ 
Computing/11-04-26/Forrester_forecasts_USD_241_billion_cloud_computing_ 
market_by_2020.aspx. 
 32 Vivek Kundra, Federal Cloud Computing Strategy, THE WHITE HOUSE 6 (2011), 
https://cio.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/09/Federal-Cloud-Computing-
Strategy.pdf. 
 33 See Gianpaolo Carraro & Fred Chong, Software as a Service (SaaS): An Enterprise 
Perspective, MSDN (Oct. 2006), http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa905332.aspx 
(“Simply put, SaaS can be defined as—software deployed as a hosted service and 
accessed over the Internet.”). 
 34 See Email as a Service (EaaS), INFO.APPS.GOV, http://www.info.apps.gov/content/ 
email-service-eaas-0 (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (explaining how E-mail as a service 
virtually delivers an e-mail program to your computer without the need for a software 
program). 
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applications, or “Apps,”35 such as Gmail, Google Calendar, Google 
Docs, and Google Drive.36  Today, when a user logs into Gmail, 
Google’s e-mail program, the user accesses e-mail through a 
remote Google program that has not been installed on the user’s 
computer.37  When the user sends an e-mail to another user through 
Gmail, Google stores that data on its data server until the recipient 
opens the e-mail, thereby drawing information from the data server 
onto the user’s monitor.38  Every time a user accesses the 
restaurant reservation website OpenTable, uses Adobe services, or 
takes a survey through Survey Monkey, she is accessing a SaaS 
platform. 
IaaS provides virtual hardware storage for corporations and 
government users, such as Amazon web services.39  PaaS includes 
a platform for accessing other cloud software—an example is 
Facebook.40 
Data servers that store private, business, and governmental 
information are located all over the world.41  These server farms 
 
 35 Wesley Chun, What is Cloud Computing?, GOOGLE DEVELOPERS (June 2012), 
https://developers.google.com/appengine/training/intro/whatiscc (“Another example of 
SaaS from Google includes their Apps product: office productivity software hosted and 
run by Google online.”). 
 36 Google Apps for Business, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/enterprise/apps/ 
business/index21.html?utm_expid=65468332-15&utm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 37 See Supported Browsers, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/mail/bin/ 
answer.py?hl=en&answer=6557 (last updated Dec. 28, 2012) (stating that a user must use 
an Internet browser to access all Google remote programs such as Gmail). 
 38 See What Happens to Messages Stored on Gmail’s Servers?, GOOGLE, 
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=13288&topic=1668962&c
tx=topic (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). 
 39 See Chun, supra note 35. 
 40 See Cloud Computing, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/industry/government/ 
guides/cloud_computing/5-PaaS.aspx (“With Platform as a Service (PaaS), you can 
develop new applications or services in the cloud that do not depend on a specific 
platform to run, and you can make them widely available to users through the Internet.”); 
see also David Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Changes—It’s All About the Platform, FORBES 
(Sept. 22, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/techonomy/2011/09/22/ 
facebooks-changesits-all-about-the-platform; Phil Wainewright, Is Facebook a Paas 
Contender?, ZDNET (Apr. 11, 2008, 5:07 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/saas/is-
facebook-a-paas-contender/488.  
 41 See Mark Prigg, Inside the Internet: Google Allows First Ever Look at the Eight 
Vast Data Centres that Power the Online World, MAILONLINE (Oct. 17, 2012, 1:22 PM), 
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are extraordinarily costly to run and power.42  As a result, 
American companies seek to reduce the operating costs of cloud 
computing technology by locating these servers outside of the 
United States.43  For instance, Amazon has data servers located in 
São Paulo, Amsterdam, Dublin, Frankfurt, London, Paris, 
Stockholm, Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo.44  Google, having 
long kept their servers’ locations discreet, has recently revealed 
some information about the locations of their data centers.45  
Facebook opened an enormous server farm, the size of eleven 
football fields, in Luleå, Sweden to take advantage of the cold 
climate and to lower the costs associated with cooling down data 
servers.46  Amazon, Google, and Facebook are just three of the 
many corporations that provide cloud computing services and store 
their data servers worldwide. 
3. Data Replication as a Way of Protecting Information 
There are also environmental risks associated with the location 
and maintenance of data servers.  In December 2011, Microsoft’s 
cloud computing program Azure reported that their data centers 
 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2219188/Inside-Google-pictures-gives-
look-8-vast-data-centres.html (last updated Oct. 19, 2012). 
 42 See Richard Orange, Global Server Farms Around the World, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 
26, 2011, 4:04 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8850861/Global-
server-farms-around-the-world.html. 
 43 See Veronique Greenwood, Move Server Farms to Desert? Data is Easier to Move 
Than Power, After All, DISCOVER (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:08 PM), https://blogs.discover 
magazine.com/80beats/2011/04/27/move-server-farms-to-desert-data-is-easier-to-move-
than-power-after-all/#.UVNaWaV4sW9 (“Keeping all those servers cool has been said to 
eat up 50% of the electricity such centers need—in fact, Iceland has proposed that its 
chilly climate makes it an ideal place for server farms.”); Richard Orange, Facebook to 
Build Server Farm on Edge of Arctic Circle, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 26, 2011, 2:47 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/facebook/8850575/Facebook-to-build-server-
farm-on-edge-of-Arctic-Circle.html. 
 44 Amazon CloudFront, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/cloudfront/; 
Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws. 
amazon.com/s3; Rich Miller, Where Amazon’s Data Centers Are Located, DATA CENTER 
KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/11/ 
18/where-amazons-data-centers-are-located. 
 45 See Prigg, supra note 41; see also Data Center Locations, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations (last visited Apr. 4, 2013) 
(listing the domestic and international location of thirteen data centers in the Americas, 
Asia and Europe). 
 46 See Orange, supra note 43. 
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lose power and information 11.1 times per month due to electrical 
outages.47  This risk is especially prevalent in areas prone to 
natural disasters.48  The production of data server components, 
which often takes place in these risk-prone areas, further threatens 
the functionality of server farms.  For example, the New York 
Times reported that, in November 2011, flooding forced factories 
producing hard drives in Thailand to shut down.49  These hard 
drives are necessary to store data in cloud computing centers.50  
Thailand’s estimated production loss was thirty percent of its 
annual output, or fifty million hard drives.51  With the booming 
cloud computing industry already operating at a ninety percent 
production output, the Thailand disaster posed a marked threat to 
companies such as Western Digital, one of the world’s biggest 
storage companies.52 
To protect against data loss, Google and Amazon have been 
using data replication systems.53  Through data replication, 
information is replicated and then stored in multiple locations to 
 
 47 Andrew R. Hickey, Amazon, Microsoft Top Short List of Cloud Storage Providers: 
Study, CRN (Dec. 9, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.crn.com/news/cloud/232300242/ 
amazon-microsoft-top-short-list-of-cloud-storage-providers-study.htm;jsessionid 
=HBnfEdtD4F0qsPfqVY5Eog**.ecappj01?pgno=1. 
 48 See Lori MacVittie, Cloud Computing: Location Is Important, but not the Way You 
Think, DEVCENTRAL (Jan. 21, 2009), http://devcentral.f5.com/weblogs/macvittie/ 
archive/2009/01/21/cloud-computing-location-is-important-but-not-the-way-you.aspx. 
 49 Nick Bilton, Thailand Floods Could Affect Cloud Computing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 
2011, 9:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/thailand-floods-will-affect-
computer-makers-and-web-sites/?scp=1&sq=cloud%20computing&st=cse. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. (“Component makers in China, the Philippines and Malaysia could pick up 
some of the slack, but many global hard drive makers are already operating at over 90 
percent production, with some in China at 98 percent.”); Dean Takahashi, WD Resumes 
Hard Drive Production After Thailand Floods, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:39 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2011/12/01/wd-resumes-hard-drive-production-after-thailand-
floods. 
 53 See Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
http://aws.amazon.com/rds/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (“Amazon RDS automatically 
patches the database software and backs up your database, storing the backups for a user-
defined retention period and enabling point-in-time recovery.”); see also Disaster 
Recovery by Google, GOOGLE (Mar. 4, 2010), http://googleenterprise.blogspot.com/2010/ 
03/disaster-recovery-by-google.html. 
C07_SEGALL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  4:06 PM 
2013] JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES IN CLOUD COMPUTING 1117 
ensure that the information is always accessible and secure in the 
event of disaster or intentional destruction.54 
B. The U.S. Government’s Plan for Cloud Computing 
The federal government is among the greatest spenders on 
technology in the United States.55  Each year, the government 
spends $80 billion dollars on information technology.56  As such, 
when Vivek Kundra, the former U.S. Chief Information Officer 
(CIO), joined the Obama Administration, one of his main 
objectives was the promotion of efficient and effective use of the 
federal information technology budget.57  Inefficiencies in the 
system ranged from having thousands of inactive websites to 
having more than ten thousand separate information technology 
systems that were idle ninety-three percent of the time.58  Kundra, 
who unsurprisingly also fought to make President Obama the first 
president to receive a smartphone, started consolidating these IT 
systems—marking the government’s shift towards cloud 
computing systems.59 
At the Forum on Information Technology Management Reform 
in December 2010, Kundra released his “25 Point Implementation 
Plan to Reform Federal Information Technology Management.”60  
The eighteen-month plan proposed a three-step “Cloud First” 
policy for all federal agencies.61  The Cloud First policy required 
 
 54 See Danny Bradbury, Remote Replication: Comparing Data Replication Methods, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Remote-replication-
Comparing-data-replication-methods (“Remote replication copies data to a secondary site 
as part of a disaster recovery plan; it traditionally involved backing up application data, 
but it is now possible to replicate entire virtual machines too. This can be useful to 
maintain server images with the latest configuration, including operating system and 
application security patches that are all set to be made live in case of a serious outage at 
the primary site.”). 
 55 Geoff Colvin, Uncle Sam’s First CIO, FORTUNE MAGAZINE (July 13, 2011, 3:37 
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/13/news/companies/vivek_kundra_leadership. 
fortune/index.htm (“The U.S. government is the world’s largest consumer of information 
technology . . . .”). 
 56 Id.  
 57 See Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems, supra note 4.  
 58 See Colvin, supra note 56. 
 59 Id. 
 60 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
 61 Id. 
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the agencies to use cloud computing instead of buying hardware 
and software.62  Under Cloud First, agencies had an obligation to 
identify three “must move” services by March 2010, and to move 
one of these to the cloud by December 2010, and to then move the 
remaining two services to the cloud by June 2011.63  Kundra 
predicted that the U.S. government would save at least five billion 
dollars by using cloud computing instead of the old hard-copy 
storage system.64 
On February 8, 2011, Kundra released the “Federal Cloud 
Computing Strategy,” which further explains the role of cloud 
computing in federal agencies and outlines his expectations under 
the Cloud First policy.65  Cloud First imposes many new 
technological requirements on federal agencies.  Each agency has 
its own designated Chief Information Officer, who is tasked with 
carrying out the 25 Point Plan and ensuring that its requirements 
are met.66  The CIO of each federal agency is also responsible for 
ensuring a “safe, secure cloud solution” and for overseeing the 
allocation of funds.67  Cloud First also requires each agency to 
“[d]etermine cloud readiness” and ensure that the security 
requirements are met.68  To comply with these security 
requirements, CIOs must look at “[s]tatutory compliance to laws, 
regulations, and agency requirements,” privacy and confidentiality, 
integrity, and “[d]ata controls and access policies to determine 
where data can be stored and who can access physical locations.”69 
 
 62 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. See also David Saleh Rauf, 
Stakes High for Cloud Contractors, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2011, 10:54 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63786.html#ixzz1bAXu6nqE. 
 63 25 POINT IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 5, at 1. 
 64 See Kim Hart, Vivek Kundra Leaving White House for Harvard, POLITICO (June 16, 
2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/57115.html. 
 65 VIVEK KUNDRA, THE WHITE HOUSE, FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY 2 
(2011), available at http://ctovision.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Federal-Cloud-
Computing-Strategy1.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY]. 
 66 See Steven VanRoekel, The Changing Role of Federal Chief Information Officers, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 8, 2011, 6:22 PM), whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/08/changing-
role-federal-chief-information-officers. 
 67 See FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY, supra note 65, at 13. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 14. 
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Cloud First utilizes the General Services Administration (“the 
GSA”), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (the 
“NIST”), the Department of Homeland Security (the “DHS”), and 
the Office of Management and Budget (the “OMB”) to help 
agencies “efficiently acquire cloud computing capabilities and 
mitigate threats.”70  The NIST and the GSA are responsible for 
creating cloud computing standards, giving guidance to the 
agencies, and developing contracts with suppliers.71  The DHS is 
responsible for monitoring security issues related to cloud 
computing.72  To coordinate all of these agencies and offices, the 
OMB provides guidance as the agencies transition to cloud 
computing.73 
Additionally, Cloud First mandates that agencies form 
contracts with private technology companies.74  To streamline the 
approval process for cloud service providers, the government plans 
to use an “approve once and use often” approach.75  Besides big 
players in the cloud service provider industry—Amazon, Dell, 
Microsoft, and Google—there are many smaller private technology 
companies that have contracted with the government to develop 
the cloud computing industry.76  Each CIO has a massive IT 
budget to fund the transition to cloud computing.77  For example, 
the Honorable Roger Baker, the CIO for the Department of 
Veteran Affairs, currently operates a three billion dollar budget, 
largely supporting the health and benefits administration.78 
C. U.S. Jurisdictional Policies and the Effect of these Policies on 
Cloud Computing 
The dynamic nature of the cloud computing industry creates a 
system in which data originating in one country passes through and 
is stored within several foreign jurisdictions, sometimes 
 
 70 Id. at 25. 
 71 See id. at 31. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. at 16. 
 75 Id. at 28. 
 76 See Rauf, supra note 62. 
 77 See FEDERAL CLOUD COMPUTING STRATEGY, supra note 65, at 35. 
 78 Transparency and Federal Management IT Systems, supra note 4, at 17. 
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simultaneously.79  As the SWIFT incident demonstrated earlier, the 
multi-jurisdictional nature of cloud computing creates issues for 
determining what state or country may have access to data stored 
on a server.  Courts must determine the law that should apply when 
resolving cloud computing disputes and, as a threshold matter, 
whether the court can even hear the dispute.80  The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure dictate that a court must be able to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant for that defendant to be 
properly brought before the court.81  Once in court, choice of law 
principles govern which law applies: the law of the state in which 
the subject of the lawsuit occurred, or that of the state in which the 
court sits.82 
1. U.S. Personal Jurisdiction 
In the United States, personal jurisdiction is governed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Due Process Clause prevents any 
State from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.”83  Due process protects a person’s 
right “to be subject only to lawful power,” which includes 
protecting litigants from having to defend lawsuits in arbitrary 
locations.84  To assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation, 
the Court held in International Shoe Co. v. Washington that due 
process requires (1) that the defendant have certain minimum 
contacts with the forum state and (2) that compelling the defendant 
 
 79 Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and the Policies of Data Sovereignty, 
22ND EUROPEAN REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SOCIETY 10 (Sept. 18–21, 2011), https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/ 
52197/1/672481146.pdf. 
 80 See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 2 (stating that “the cloud raises complex policy 
questions of security . . . privacy . . . and jurisdiction . . . [and that] [i]f data that falls 
within a category subject to U.S. export control regulations ends up on a server in 
Europe, the question of whether or not a violation of U.S. export control laws has 
occurred will often turn in large part on the question of whether that data travelled there 
from the United States”).  
 81 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). 
 82 Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 724 (2009). 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 84 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). 
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to defend in that state would not “offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”85  Hence, a defendant’s actions, not 
his expectations, give a state’s courts jurisdiction over him.86 
Since International Shoe, the Court has differentiated between 
specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.87  A court has 
“specific jurisdiction” over a defendant when the suit “aris[es] out 
of or [is] related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”88  
Specific jurisdiction includes purposeful availment, in which a 
defendant has conducted activity within a state and has thus 
invoked the benefits and protections of that state’s laws.89  A 
state’s court has general jurisdiction over a defendant when, 
although the suit did not “aris[e] out of [and is not] related to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum,”90 the defendant has had 
“continuous and systematic” contacts with the state that “render 
[him] essentially at home in the forum State.”91 
2. Personal Jurisdiction over the Internet and Through Data 
Servers 
The Supreme Court has found that technological advancements 
call for the redefinition of traditional personal jurisdiction 
doctrine.92  In Hanson v. Denckla, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated 
that “as technological progress has increased the flow of commerce 
between States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has 
 
 85 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463).  International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation with its principal 
place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Id. at 313.  International Shoe Co. hired 
salesmen who resided in Washington. Id.  Washington State brought a suit against 
International Shoe Co. in Washington state court to recover unpaid contributions to state 
unemployment compensation fund. Id. at 311–12. 
 86 J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (“[The] facts may reveal an intent to serve the 
U.S. market, but they do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New 
Jersey market.”). 
 87 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 
 88 Id.  
 89 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (“[I]t is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”). 
 90 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9. 
 91 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
 92 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.  
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undergone a similar increase.”93  At first lower courts struggled to 
establish jurisdictional boundaries within the Internet’s virtual 
space.  In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, Second Circuit 
Judge Van Graafeiland stated, “attempting to apply established [ ] 
law in the fast-developing world of the internet is somewhat like 
trying to board a moving bus.”94  However, as Internet transactions 
have developed into a distinct business and social marketplace, 
there has been an increasing amount of judicial precedent as to the 
ways a court can establish jurisdiction based on a user’s Internet 
activities.95 
Many courts have found that server location—where the 
processing of information occurs—implicates a valid state 
interest.96  For example, in 2007, the Eastern District of Virginia, 
in a union dispute case over e-mails sent to Verizon, held that the 
location of the corporation’s data server, along with the location of 
some of its employees who received the e-mails, was sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction in Virginia.97  In 2012, the Second Circuit 
explored the question of whether a Connecticut court could 
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who, while living and 
working in Canada, accessed a computer data server in 
 
 93 Id.   
 94 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 95 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997) (applying a sliding-scale test of commercial interactivity to measure an Internet 
user’s level of engagement with a particular website, which essentially established a 
threshold for whether a user has “purposefully availed” themselves to a state based on 
their Internet activity).  The Western District of Pennsylvania created the Zippo test in 
response to the jurisdictional problems created by the Internet. See id.  Many circuit 
courts rely on the Zippo test for guidance in determining when a court can properly claim 
specific jurisdiction over a user. See e.g., Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 
251 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In analyzing personal jurisdiction in the internet context, many 
courts have turned to the standards set out more than ten years ago by a judge of the 
Western District of Pennsylvania in Zippo . . . .”); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 
318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing Zippo as the “seminal authority regarding 
personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web site”); ALS Scan, Inc. 
v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 713 (4th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Zippo 
test). 
 96 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 
1962 (2005). 
 97 See Aitken v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 496 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659 (E.D. Va. 
2007). 
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Connecticut in connection with illegal activity.98  The District 
Court had dismissed the complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.99  The Second Circuit held that jurisdiction is 
“reasonable” as the defendant “purposefully availed herself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within Connecticut” and “[i]t is 
not material that [the defendant] was outside of Connecticut when 
she accessed the . . . servers.”100 
When U.S. courts try to establish jurisdiction over international 
cases, it is difficult to establish proper jurisdiction because United 
States laws often conflict with the laws of other countries.  In 
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’antisemitisme 
(“LICRA”), the Ninth Circuit heard a case that involved both U.S. 
and French law.101  At the time of the suit, Yahoo was incorporated 
in Delaware, had data servers in California, and foreign 
subsidiaries in France, the UK, and India.102  The website 
Yahoo.com provided a user platform for Nazi discussions and 
auction information.103  Activity such as this is unlawful under the 
French Criminal Code, which bans the exhibition and sale of Nazi 
propaganda.104  LICRA sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo in 
France, ordering Yahoo to take the Nazi paraphernalia off the 
Internet.105  The letter was followed by interim orders from a 
French court demanding that Yahoo remove the anti-Semitic 
content from its website.106  The French court held Yahoo liable 
under the French penal code because the illegal content was viewed 
in France.107  Yahoo argued that it did not have the technology to 
remove the content from its French site without affecting its U.S. 
site.108 
 
 98 MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 726–27 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 99 Id. at 727. 
 100 Id. at 729–30. 
 101 See 433 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 102 Id. at 1201–02. 
 103 Id. at 1202. 
 104 See id. at 1221. 
 105 Id. at 1232 (Tashima, J., concurring). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 1225 (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
 108 Id. at 1203. 
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Yahoo reacted by filing suit in a U.S. district court, claiming 
that the French interim orders were not enforceable in the United 
States.109  Yahoo alleged that LICRA could not hold Yahoo liable 
in the United States due to First Amendment protections.110  The 
U.S. district court found that the decision by the French court was 
inconsistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution, and 
therefore, the French court’s decision was inapplicable in the 
United States.111 
LICRA then appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.112  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
portions of the earlier holding but maintained that the U.S. district 
court had personal jurisdiction over the French defendants.113  The 
French court order was left unenforced despite the violation of 
French law.114  Yahoo then decided to remove the Nazi 
paraphernalia from its website entirely.115  This is just one example 
of the United States’ problem of territorial jurisdiction when 
conflicts involving international law arise.116 
3. Choice of Law Doctrine as Applied in the United States 
Choice of law is the doctrine used to determine which body of 
law applies in a dispute between parties from different states or 
countries.117  As the SWIFT incident demonstrated, when the EU 
had a conflict with the United States regarding international 
financial data, it became unclear which jurisdiction would govern 
 
 109 Id. at 1204. 
 110 Id. at 1206. 
 111 Id. at 1204–05. 
 112 Id. at 1205. 
 113 See id. at 1201. 
 114 See id. (“The district court held that . . . the French orders are not enforceable in the 
United States because such enforcement would violate the First Amendment. . . .  LICRA 
and UEJF appeal only the personal jurisdiction, ripeness, and abstention holdings.”). 
 115 Susan Dodson, The Very Long Arm of the Law, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2001, 1:15 
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/nov/09/internetnews. 
 116 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 
261, 271 (“The cases reveal that, to the extent that an Internet actor strives to target users 
in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign forum can assert territorial jurisdiction and apply the 
forum’s law.  While a number of the cases involved protecting the intellectual property of 
parties in the forum, the vice cases illustrate that the principle applies equally to issues of 
public order.  Courts assert territorial jurisdiction to protect values held in the forum.”). 
 117 Whytock, supra note 82, at 724. 
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the dispute.  Ultimately, the United States negotiated an agreement 
with the EU, leaving this issue undecided.118 
Choice of law issues are critical in the cloud computing context 
as many service providers use data replication to store the same 
information in many jurisdictions.  This practice creates 
uncertainty as to which law would apply; however, the problem 
can be ameliorated with a simple choice of law provision in the 
underlying contract. 
The U.S. Constitution requires a state to enforce proceedings of 
other states, limit the jurisdiction of a state’s courts, prevent a state 
from discriminating against citizens of another state, give effect to 
the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, and 
limit a state’s power to apply local law in interstate commerce.119  
There is no uniform choice of law rule in the United States; 
instead, each state has its own choice of law provisions.120  Some 
states mandate that the law where an incident occurred governs the 
case, while other states always use their own laws.121 
Today, due to the different state or international laws that can 
be involved in a single contract, many contracts include a choice of 
law provision that dictates what law will apply should a contract 
dispute arise.122  The Restatement of Conflict of Laws permits 
contracting parties to choose a governing law, but if the contract 
 
 118 See Terrorist Finance Tracking Center, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Terrorist-
Finance-Tracking/Pages/tftp.aspx (“At the end of 2009 SWIFT stopped storing certain 
sets of these critical data on its U.S. servers and hosts those data in the European Union.  
The United States negotiated an agreement with the European Union on the processing 
and transfer of this information to the U.S. Treasury Department. The Agreement became 
effective on August 1, 2010.”). 
 119 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 120 Whytock, supra note 82, at 724. 
 121 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. b (1971) (“The court 
should give a local statute the range of application intended by the legislature when these 
intentions can be ascertained and can constitutionally be given effect.  If the legislature 
intended that the statute should be applied to the out-of-state facts involved, the court 
should so apply it unless constitutional considerations forbid.  On the other hand, if the 
legislature intended that the statute should be applied only to acts taking place within the 
state, the statute should not be given a wider range of application.”). 
 122 See id. at cmt. g (“[T]he parties are free within broad limits to choose the law to 
govern the validity of their contract.”). 
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does not cover a particular issue, there are opportunities for parties 
to circumvent the choice-of law provisions.123 
These choice-of-law provisions are prevalent in business and 
government contracts.  Public cloud computing companies like 
Amazon, Microsoft, Rackspace, and Google—as well as private 
companies such as Eucalyptus—require anyone who uses their 
services to agree to contracts governing technology services.124  
Many of the contracts between the service providers and users who 
purchase these services include choice-of-law provisions.  For 
example, Amazon Web Service mandates that: 
The laws of the State of Washington, without 
reference to conflict of law rules, govern this 
Agreement and any dispute of any sort that might 
arise between you and us.  Any dispute relating in 
any way to the Service Offerings or this Agreement 
where a party seeks aggregate relief of $7,500 or 
more will be adjudicated in any state or federal 
court in King County, Washington.  You consent to 
exclusive jurisdiction and venue in those courts.125 
This contract essentially requires that any cloud computing 
dispute must be resolved in Washington State, even if the user is 
located in different part of the world. 
 
 123 See id. (“There are occasions, particularly in the area of negligence, when the parties 
act without giving thought to the legal consequences of their conduct or to the law that 
may be applied.  In such situations, the parties have no justified expectations to protect, 
and this factor can play no part in the decision of a choice-of-law question.”). 
 124 See Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation 
on Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 163 (discussing 
the negative effect that cloud provider clickwrap agreements could have on the cloud 
computing industry); see, e.g., Cloud Glossary, EUCALYPTUS, http://www.eucalyptus. 
com/resources/ cloud-overview/cloud-glossary#q13 (“[A Service Level Agreement is a] 
contract, typically between a service provider and a service client, that stipulates the 
minimum quality of service the client will receive, the units and measurement 
methodology that will be used to audit service quality, and the time frame over which it 
will be measured.”); Sample Business Contract, ONE CLE, http://contracts.onecle. 
com/gomez/ rackspace-services-2007-03-30.shtml. See generally Lynn Greiner & Lauren 
Gibbons Paul, SLA Definitions and Solutions, CIO, http://www.cio.com/article/ 
128900/SLA_Definitions_and_Solutions.   
 125 AWS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, § 13.11, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, available at 
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated Aug. 23, 2011). 
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By analyzing the policies that affect cloud computing, one can 
see how critical location becomes in the legal context.  Courts’ 
own rules, which typically exercise jurisdiction through data center 
location, are often in direct contrast to choice-of-law provisions 
that govern in which state the issue must be litigated.  Although 
courts respect choice-of-law provisions, lawyers can easily find 
loopholes in these contracts and bring suit in a location in which 
the data server sits. 
D. International Provisions Regulating Data and Privacy 
Conflict-of-law issues in the Internet context are aggravated by 
the fact that data is regulated differently throughout the world.  If a 
corporation stores data in a cloud that has data servers in a foreign 
country, the law of that country may govern its data.  Depending 
on the foreign country in which one’s data is stored, the foreign 
country’s law may affect 1) the privacy of your data and 2) 
whether that foreign country’s government or police can access 
your data.  In the European Union (EU), the laws on data privacy 
are highly developed and broad directives regulate data.126  This is 
a result of the structure of the European political system and the 
view of privacy as a fundamental right, equal, if not superior, to 
economic rights.127  In Asia, many countries have started to host 
data centers, but individual government attempts to regulate the 
industry are not as expansive as those in Europe.128 
1. European Union Legislation Regulating Data 
The European Commission, the executive body of the 
European Union (“EU”), represents the interests of the EU and 
 
 126 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995, on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of such Data, arts. 2-4 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31 (EC) 
[hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC]. 
 127 Eric Pfanner, Guarding a “Fundamental Right” of Privacy in Europe, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/technology/guarding-a-
fundamental-right-of-privacy-in-europe.html (“‘In Europe, we consider privacy a 
fundamental right,’ [French privacy regulator, Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin] said. ‘That 
doesn’t mean it is exclusive of other rights, but economic rights are not superior to 
privacy.’”). 
 128 Compare infra Part I.D.2 with Part I.D.1. 
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proposes legislation to the European Parliament and the European 
Council.129  The European Commission is also responsible for 
administering and implementing EU policies and negotiating 
international matters.130 
There are two major pieces of EU legislation that affect data: 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC131 and the proposed 
General Data Protection Regulation.132  Since directives are the 
European form of legislation addressed to EU Member States,133  
each Member State is responsible for incorporating every directive 
into its own legal system, but the directive may still have legal 
force even if the member state has elected not enforced all of its 
provisions.134 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament discusses the 
protection of individuals with respect to the processing of personal 
data.135  The Directive’s recitals generally “explain the background 
to the legislation and the aims and objectives of the legislation.”136  
Recitals (6)–(8) and (20) specifically provide objectives for the 
cross-border flow of data,137 while Recitals (42)–(44) govern the 
 
 129 About this Site, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/about_en.htm (last 
updated Nov. 16, 2012). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126. 
 132 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 
final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation]. 
 133 DATA PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPA, at 4, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/guide/guide-ukingdom_en.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2013). 
 134 Id. 
 135 See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126.  The Directive defines “personal data” as 
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); 
an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” Id. 
 136 Guide to the Approximation of European Union Environmental Legislation: Annex 
I: How To Interpret EU Environmental Legislation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/guide/annex1.htm (last updated March 2, 2012). 
 137 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 126, at 31–33. 
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conditions that allow the member states in the EU to restrict access 
to information.138 
Further, the Directive addresses the free movement of personal 
data.139  Recitals (56)–(58) require that, to transfer personal data to 
a third party country outside of the EU, the country must attain an 
“adequate level of protection.”140  Hence, the EU does not allow 
cloud computing data servers to be located outside of the EU 
unless the adequacy standards are met.141  Although this Directive 
was enacted in 1995, it continues to help limit European data from 
third party access. 
On January 25, 2012, the European Commission announced a 
proposal to create a General Data Protection Regulation (the “Data 
Protection Regulation”).142  The Data Protection Regulation will 
differ from past directives because it will be immediately 
applicable to all member states, and will impose fines if member 
states do not comply.143  The regulation will affect data processors 
and cross-border data transfers.144 
 
 138 Id. at 35. 
 139 Id. at 31. 
 140 Id. at 36–37.  Specifically, it states that “the transfer to a third country of personal 
data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer,” may 
only take place if the country has an “adequate level of protection. Id. at 38; see also 
Welcome to the U.S.-EU & U.S.-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/ (last updated Apr. 11, 2012). 
 141 See Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in 
Third Countries, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/document/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm (last updated Feb. 
11, 2013 ).  As of February 11, 2013, the Commission has recognized Andorra, 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, State of Israel, Isle 
of Man, Jersey, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and 
the transfer of Air Passenger Name Record to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection as providing adequate protection. Id. 
 142 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 132. 
 143 Jane Finlayson-Brown, How to Prepare for Proposed EU Data Protection 
Regulation, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, http://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/ 
Proposed-EU-Data-Protection-Regulation-what-should-companies-be-thinking-about 
(last visited March 17, 2013). 
 144 Id. 
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2. Asian Governments’ Approach to Regulating Data 
Asian countries that currently host data centers have taken 
different approaches to regulating cloud computing than the U.S. 
and the EU.  Some Asian countries’ laws permit government 
access to data within the data server that is sitting on its 
territory.145  This policy creates legal privacy issues when third 
party contractors, such as Google or Amazon, have other 
countries’ data stored in data servers within these countries. 
In Japan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
(MIC) regulates the cloud computing industry.146  The Global ICT 
Policy Division of the MIC created a strategy for promoting the 
cloud computing industry both within Japan, through the 
development of  the Kasumigaseki Cloud and the Local 
Government Cloud,147 and internationally, through the 
development of “new cloud solutions in cooperation with Asian 
countries.”148  In November 2011, the Japanese government stated 
that in the future, it plans to address the following international 
issues: “[j]urisdiction over databases stored in other countries (e.g. 
privacy protection act),” “[d]ispute settlement mechanism[s],” 
“[c]ountermeasures against ‘harmful’ information,” “[the] 
[p]ossibility of government intervention with respect to private-
sector data,” and “[o]wnership of [intellectual property rights] 
regarding data stored on a cloud data center in other countries.”149 
India’s approach to investments and regulations in cloud 
computing technology has been delayed due to government 
uncertainty over data security and privacy.150  Despite the 
 
 145 See Carol Ko, Cloud Legal Issues III: Data Privacy Laws in Asia, ASIA CLOUD 
FORUM, http://www.asiacloudforum.com/content/cloud-legal-issues-iii-data-privacy-
laws-asia (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
 146 See YUMIKO MYOKEN, CLOUD COMPUTING IN JAPAN 3 (2009), available at 
http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/5606907/5633632/cloud-computing-japan. 
 147 Kazutaka Nakamizo, Cloud Services in Japan, MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND 
COMMUNICATIONS, JAPAN, 6 (2011), http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/ 
eng/presentation/pdf/111102_1.pdf. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 8. 
 150 Rahul Sachitanand, Indian CIOs’ Cloud Concerns, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 5, 2012, 
12:31 PM), http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-01-05/services-
apps/30592821_1_cloud-server-data. 
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uncertainty, the government continues to allow companies to place 
their data servers within its borders.151  India’s Information 
Technology Act of 2000 governs the privacy rights accorded to 
data servers.  Provision 69 reads: 
If the Controller is satisfied that it is necessary or 
expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty 
or integrity of India, the security of the State, 
friendly relations with foreign Stales or public order 
or for preventing incitement to the commission of 
any cognizable offence, for reasons to be recorded 
in writing, by order, direct any agency of the 
Government to intercept any information 
transmitted through any computer resource. 
This provision allows the government to intercept data located 
in data servers within its territory. 
Independently, Asian countries are trying to determine how to 
attract private corporations to build technology and cloud 
computing entities in their respective countries, while at the same 
time trying to regulate the growing industry and determine how 
much access they are going to give local police to the data servers 
on their territory. 
3. International Treaties that Affect Cloud Computing 
Technology 
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was the first 
international treaty addressing Computer and Internet Crime.152  
When the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in August 2006, then-
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist commented, “[w]hile balancing 
civil liberty and privacy concerns, this treaty encourages the 
sharing of critical electronic evidence among foreign countries so 
that law enforcement can more effectively investigate and combat 
these crimes.”153 
 
 151 See id. 
 152 See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. 
 153 US Ratifies Treaty On Cybercrime, IOL NEWS (Aug. 5, 2006, 12:06 PM), 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/us-ratifies-treaty-on-cybercrime-1.288245. 
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Article 19 of the Budapest Convention, entitled “Search and 
seizure of stored computer data,” requires each Party to the treaty 
to adopt legislation permitting its “competent authorities” to access 
data servers in its territories without permission of the owner of 
information, and clause 3 provides local authorities permission to 
seize, remove, or make copies of the computer data.154  Article 22, 
which discusses jurisdiction, mandates that each Party establish 
jurisdiction over any computer-related offense, when the offense is 
either committed in its territory or by one of its nationals.155  
Further, jurisdiction over offenses committed in its territory cannot 
be waived.156  If two or more Parties claim jurisdiction over any 
offense listed in the Convention, “the Parties involved shall, where 
appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”157 
The Council of Europe has attempted to review the decisions 
made during the Budapest Convention because of the widespread 
use of cloud computing and the urgent need for increased 
international co-operation.158  The United States and the EU refuse 
to draft another treaty on cybercrime, despite international growth 
of cross-border cybercrime.159 
At the Twelfth UN Congress on Crime Prevention and 
Criminal Justice in 2010, countries met to discuss prevention and 
response to Cybercrime.160  The United States, the EU, and other 
governing bodies that supported the Budapest Convention rejected 
 
 154 Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 152, at art. 19. 
 155 Id. at art. 22(1). 
 156 Id. at art. 22(2) (“Each Party may reserve the right not to apply or to apply only in 
specific cases or conditions the jurisdiction rules laid down in paragraphs 1.b through 1.d 
of this article or any part thereof.”). 
 157 Id. at art. 22(5). 
 158 See UN Rejects International Cybercrime Treaty, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Apr. 20, 
2010, 3:44 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/1280092617/UN-rejects-
international-cybercrime-treaty (“Cloud computing trends in particular have led the 
Council of Europe to open a review of the Budapest Convention.”). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
Salvador, Braz., Apr. 12–19, 2010, 12th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice Opens Today, U.N. Doc. UNIS/CP/601 (Apr. 12, 2010), available 
at http://www.un.org/en/conf/crimecongress2010/pdf/pr100412-2.pdf. 
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Russia and China’s proposal for a new Cybercrime treaty.161  Both 
the United States and the EU asked for more stringent privacy 
protections in the Budapest Convention to protect against “over-
zealous” police intervention into cloud computing data servers 
stored in other countries.162 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
As demonstrated above, countries approach differently the 
question of how best to regulate the burgeoning cloud computing 
industry and whether there should be cross-country restrictions on 
data.163  Scholars who have studied cloud computing, as well 
representatives of the cloud computing industry, are divided on 
how the government should regulate the industry in the future.  As 
demonstrated in the introduction, the location of data has broad 
implications regarding who can access the data and which 
countries’ laws regulate access to information.  This Part first 
presents the tension between U.S. and EU policy and law regarding 
cloud computing, then explores competing legal theories on the 
future regulation of cloud computing technology. 
A.  The U.S. Government’s Approach to Regulating Cloud 
Computing Technology 
In the United States, privacy and technology law is sector-
specific and is governed by a varying blend of legislation, 
regulation, and self-regulation.164  As will be seen, this blended 
approach presents unique challenges as the United States seeks to 
strike the proper regulatory balance. 
 
 161 See Conflict Over Proposed United Nations Cybercrime Treaty, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, (Apr. 15, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/ 
news/1280092581/Conflict-over-proposed-United-Nations-cybercrime-treaty. 
 162 UN Rejects International Cybercrime Treaty, supra note 158. 
 163 See Patrick Baillie, Can European Firms Legally Use U.S. Clouds To Store Data?, 
FORBES (Jan. 2, 2012, 6:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/01/02/can-
european-firms-legally-use-u-s-clouds-to-store-data/ (describing the main differences 
between U.S. and EU law). 
 164 See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012). 
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1. Governing Cloud Computing Through Legislation 
Legislation governing cloud computing is tailored to the 
consumer and the industry.  The data privacy rules of the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), for 
example, are vastly different from those in the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (GLBA), which regulates the financial sector.165  
HIPAA places heavy restrictions on agreements with cloud service 
providers and mandates that parties enter into a business associate 
contract to protect private patient information.166  The GLBA, in 
contrast, requires that financial institutions enter into strict 
contracts with service providers, prohibiting the service provider 
from disclosing user information except under specific 
circumstances.167 
The U.S. Patriot Act, originally developed as a response to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorism acts, is one of the only laws that 
affects the entire cloud computing industry.  Under the Act, a U.S.-
based cloud service provider is subject to rules requiring it to turn 
over user information.168  Section 217 states, “[i]t shall not be 
unlawful . . . for a person . . . to intercept the wire or electronic 
communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, 
or from the protected computer” if 1) the owner of the computer 
 
 165 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1341 (1999) (“An Act [t]o 
enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential 
framework for the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other 
financial service providers . . . .”). 
 166 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936; LISA J. SOTTO, BRIDGET C. TREACY & MELINDA L. 
MCLELLAN, PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING, 2–3 (2010). 
 167 SOTTO, ET AL., supra note 166, at 2; see Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, BUREAU OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER, http://business.ftc.gov/privacy-and-
security/gramm-leach-bliley-act (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
 168 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 217, 115 Stat. 272 (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting 
under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic communications of a computer 
trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer . . . .”) [hereinafter 
Patriot Act]; Sean Gallager, PATRIOT Act and Privacy Laws Take a Bite Out of US 
Cloud Business, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:49 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/12/patriot-act-and-privacy-laws-take-a-bite-out-of-us-cloud-
business.ars (discussing Microsoft’s inability to guarantee that its client’s data wouldn’t 
leave Europe). 
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authorizes the “interception of the computer trespasser’s 
communications on the protected computer”; 2) the person is 
engaged in an investigation; 3) the person “has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser’s 
communications will be relevant to the investigation”; and 4) 
“such interception does not acquire communications other than 
those transmitted to or from the computer trespasser.”169 
Many members of government have recognized the sweeping 
effect of the U.S. Patriot Act.  Steven M. Martinez, while Deputy 
Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, addressed the U.S. 
House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security in Washington, D.C. on April 21, 2005.170  He 
testified that: 
Section 220 [of the Patriot Act] enables federal 
courts—with jurisdiction over an investigation—to 
issue a search warrant to compel the production of 
information (such as unopened e-mail) that is stored 
with a service provider located outside their district.  
The practical effect of this section is that our FBI 
Agents are no longer limited to applying for a 
search warrant solely from the court that sits where 
the service provider happens to be located.171 
Section 220 broadly expands the power of the government to 
access information stored within data servers on U.S. soil as well 
as internationally. 
Private corporations are required to comply with the Patriot 
Act.172  According to a Forbes article in January 2012, “[b]oth 
Amazon Web Services and Microsoft have recently acknowledged 
that they would comply with U.S. government requests to release 
data stored in their European clouds, even though those clouds are 
located outside of direct U.S. jurisdiction and would conflict with 
 
 169 Patriot Act, supra note 168. 
 170 Steven M. Martinez, Deputy Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Testimony at the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security (Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/computer-
provisions-of-the-usa-patriot-act. 
 171 Id.  
 172 See Patriot Act, supra note 168, at § 1016. 
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European laws.”173  The strict requirements of the Patriot Act have 
caused several countries overseas to enact laws that restrict 
electronic data flow within their borders.174  By restricting data 
flow to servers within their borders, the United States could not 
obtain proper jurisdiction to access their information. 
2. Governing Cloud Computing Through Regulation 
United States government agencies are attempting to self-
regulate their IT practices, including the circumstances under 
which cloud computing can operate and serve as a tool to the 
government, while also complying with the Cloud First Policy.  
The U.S. agencies involved in export controls, or the trans-border 
restriction of data, have led the self-regulation movement in the 
cloud computing context.175  The Departments of State, the 
Treasury, Energy, Defense, and the Interior, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Food and Drug Administration, and other government 
organizations all govern export controls.176 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is 
the agency within the Department of Commerce that assists in 
regulating the technology industry.177  The Information 
Technology Laboratory (ITL) is a branch of NIST tasked with 
promoting “U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by 
advancing measurement science, standards, and technology.”178  
The ITL has released for public comment two proposed roadmaps 
that “define[] high-priority requirements for standards, official 
guidance and technology developments that need to be met in 
order for agencies to accelerate their migration of existing IT 
 
 173 Baillie, supra note 163. 
 174 See, e.g., David Saleh Rauf, PATRIOT Act Clouds Picture for Tech, POLITICO (Nov. 
29, 2011, 11:17 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/69366_Page2.html. 
 175 See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 1–2. 
 176 United States Government Departments and Agencies with Export Control 
Responsibilities, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/about/reslinks.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
 177 About NIST, NIST (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/nandyou.cfm 
(last updated Apr. 18, 2012). 
 178 What ITL Does, NIST (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.nist.gov/itl/what-itl-does.cfm (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2011). 
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systems to the cloud computing model.”179  While the roadmaps 
discuss security requirements, there are no substantive rules that 
regulate where data can be stored or how data can pass between 
borders. 
The General Services Administration (“GSA”) is the Federal 
Agency that oversees the business side of the federal 
government.180  Part of the responsibility of the GSA includes 
managing federal buildings, building public trust in the 
government, as well as selecting “high-quality, low-cost goods and 
services” available for purchase by the federal government’s 
agencies and employees.181  When the GSA received $2.5 billion 
in 2011 to spend on cloud e-mail services for federal employees, 
private technology companies tried to contract with the GSA to 
provide these services.182 
In October 2011, two contracting firms that provide cloud 
computing services, Technosource Information Systems and 
TrueTandem, filed protests with the Government Accountability 
Office (“GAO”) over the fact that the GSA required all data 
centers to either be located in the United States,183 or in designated 
countries as defined by Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 
 
 179 Draft Roadmap for Cloud Computing Technology, NIST (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud-110811.cfm. 
 180 Background and History, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ 
content/ 104774 (last updated Feb. 14, 2013). 
 181 A Brief History of GSA, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ 
content/103369 (last updated Feb. 25, 2013). 
 182 See Alice Lipowicz, GSA Launches $2.5B Cloud Computing Procurement, 
WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY (May 10, 2011), http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/ 
2011/05/10/gsa-issues-rfq-for-cloud-computing-options.aspx; Ed O’Keefe & Majorie 
Censer, Contract With Ties to Microsoft and Google Needs Change, GAO Says, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 17, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/contract-with-
ties-to-microsoft-and-google-needs-changes-gao-says/2011/10/17/gIQAPktPsL_ 
story.html. 
 183 See Technosource Info. Servs., LLC, B-405296 et al., Comp. Gen. (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/405296.pdf (“Technosource Information 
Systems, LLC, or Annapolis, Maryland, and TrueTandem, LLC, of Reston, Virginia, 
protest the terms of request for quotations . . . issued by the General Services 
Administration . . . for cloud computing services.”). 
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section 25.003.184  Essentially, this requirement allowed data 
centers to be placed in war-torn “countries including Afghanistan, 
Yemen, and Somalia . . . but not in countries with developing tech 
sectors” such as India.185  The GSA argued that the government 
must know where its data is stored, “because when U.S. 
government data crosses national borders, the governing legal, 
privacy, and regulatory regimes become ambiguous and raise a 
variety of concerns including the potential of foreign jurisdictions 
to assert access rights to U.S. government data.”186 
The GAO then held a hearing on this matter and asked the 
GSA to explain its data center requirement.187  The GSA explained 
that it had originally limited the location of data servers to the 
United States, but compromised because the Office of 
Management and Budget (the “OMB”) and the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (the “USTR”) advised the GSA 
that the requirement would have “impermissibly restricted free 
trade.”188  The contracting officer of the GSA admitted that the 
agency did not have a list of countries it considered acceptable, so 
the GSA limited the data centers to designated countries.189 
The GAO concluded that the GSA requirements were 
“established in an arbitrary manner” as the GSA acknowledged it 
had “no basis to differentiate between countries with acceptable 
data rights regulations and those with unacceptable data rights 
regulations.”190  Additionally, the GAO found that “with regard to 
GSA’s argument that the government has a need to know where 
U.S. government data resides and transits, this objective is 
accomplished by the requirement for vendors to identify the 
locations of their data centers.”191  The GAO sustained the 
 
 184  See id. at 2 n.1 (“FAR § 25.003 defines ‘designated country’ to include a World 
Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement country, a Free Trade 
Agreement country, a least developed country, or a Caribbean Basin country.”). 
 185 O’Keefe & Censer, supra note 182. 
 186 Technosource, supra note 183. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
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protesters’ challenges, and recommended that the GSA amend the 
terms of its contract requirements.192 
In November 2011, the GSA again solicited bids for Email-as-
a-Service (“EaaS”) government contracts.193  This time the GSA 
did not impose any location requirements and simply asked the 
cloud computing service providers to identify where their data 
centers are located.194 
As of January 2013, GSA contracts are still subject to the 
Trade Agreements Act, which requires that products “be 
manufactured or ‘substantially transformed’ in a ‘designated 
country.’”195  The designated country list, compiled by the 
Department of State, allows data centers to be located even in 
countries the government discourages Americans from traveling to, 
such as Afghanistan, Burundi, Eritrea, Guinea, Honduras, 
Mauritania, and Mexico.196 
In November 2011, the U.S. Department of the Interior 
publicly issued a request for information to identify cloud service 
providers that are interested in providing cloud-based e-mail and 
collaboration services for the Department.197  The request 
expressed the Department’s preference that service providers keep 
their data centers located in the United States.198 
 
 192 See id. 
 193 Email as a Service (EaaS), U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/112223; Nick Wakeman, GSA Restarts $2.5B E-Mail 
Contract, WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2011), http://washingtontechnology. 
com/articles/2011/11/30/gsa-cloud-email-rfq.aspx.  
 194 TOM KIREILIS & GREG NORMAN, EMAIL AS A SERVICE (EAAS) BLANKET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT (BPA) REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT 4, available at http://gsa.gov/portal/ 
getMediaData?mediaId=148887. 
 195 TAA Designated Countries, FEDERAL SCHEDULES, INC., http://gsa.federalschedules. 
com/resource-center/resources/taa-designated-countries.aspx (last updated Feb. 2013). 
 196 Current Travel Warnings, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/travel/ 
cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2013). 
 197 Cloud E-Mail and Collaboration Services (CECS)—Request for Information, 
Capabilities, and Sources Sought, FEDBIZOPPS.GOV (Oct. 28, 2011), 
https://fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=1ebb0fdd2b3c0be3c3ac38872f669
d5b&tab=core&_cview=0. 
 198 THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CLOUD-BASED EMAIL AND COLLABORATION 
SERVICES (CECS) STATEMENT OF WORK 22 (2011) (“The physical data centers for this 
requirement must be located within the continental United States.”). 
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In the United States, regulations governing cloud computing 
vary across agency.  Some agencies, such as the Department of 
Commerce, are primarily concerned with a data server’s security 
requirements, while other agencies, such as the GSA and the 
Department of the Interior, have raised concerns about the location 
of data servers, but have yet to create regulations.199 
B. The EU’s Hard Line Approach to Regulating Cloud Computing 
Conflicts with the United States’ Laissez-faire Approach 
The EU’s Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC places strict 
standards on governments that collect electronic data.200  Cloud 
computing data that originates from the European Economic Area 
(EEA) cannot be transferred to another country unless there is an 
adequate level of data protection.201  The EU will find that a 
country does not have an adequate level of protection if it 
determines that the laws in the country in question, including 
professional rules and security measures, do not adequately protect 
data transfers.202  The United States is not one of the countries that 
has a sufficient level of protection because of its weak data 
protection and inconsistent data regulation.203 
Countries that want to work with the EEA can develop 
alternative legal options to meet the adequate level of protection 
 
 199 See infra part II.B.2. 
 200 William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud Computing 
and Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 239 (2010). 
 201 SOTTO, supra note 166, at 4. 
 202 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 127, at 45–46 (“The adequacy of the level of 
protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstance 
surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations; particular 
consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final 
destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country.”). 
 203 See Sending Personal Data Outside the European Economic Area (Principle 8), 
INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/ 
data_protection/the_guide/principle_8.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).  Despite not 
being on the list of approved countries, the U.S. can still be sent personal data if “a US 
company signs up to the Safe Harbor arrangement [and] agree[s] to: following seven 
principles of information handling; and be held responsible for keeping to those 
principles by the Federal Trade Commission or other oversight schemes.” Id. 
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standard.204  For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
Safe Harbor Program purports to align the strict EU Data 
Protection Directive 95/46/EC with U.S. data privacy controls.205  
Its goal is to provide a simpler mechanism for U.S. organizations 
to comply with the EU directive, without U.S. organizations 
having to follow each of the EU’s requirements.206 
There are seven main Safe Harbor privacy requirements with 
which an organization must comply to meet EU adequacy 
standards.207  These include 1) Notice (“organizations must notify 
individuals about the purposes for which they collect and use 
information about them” and the types of third parties this 
information is disclosed to); 2) Choice (organizations “must give 
individuals the opportunity to choose” whether their information 
will be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than 
the one the individuals agreed to); 3) Onward Transfer (to disclose 
information to a third party, organizations must give notice and 
choice); 4) Access (“individuals must have access to personal 
information about them that an organization holds and be able to 
correct, amend, or delete that information where it is inaccurate” 
except where the burden of access is disproportionate to risks of 
the individual’s privacy); 5) Security (organizations must protect 
personal information from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration and destruction”); 6) Data Integrity 
(“[p]ersonal information must be relevant for the purposes for 
which it is to be used”); and 7) Enforcement (there must be 
available and independent recourse mechanisms so each 
individual’s complaints can be investigated and resolved, 
procedures for verifying that companies that adhere to safe harbor 
principles obligations to remedy problems of failure to comply, 
and sanctions for non-compliance).208  The Department of 
Commerce proclaimed that government agencies, the Federal 
 
 204 See, e.g., id. (“The Safe Harbor scheme is recognised by the European Commission 
as providing adequate protection for the rights of data individuals in connection the [sic] 
transfer of their personal data to signatories of the scheme in the USA.”). 
 205 U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/ 
eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012). 
 206 See id. (“Compliance requirements are streamlined and cost-effective . . . .”). 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
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Trade Commission, and state governments may force corporations 
to comply with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles at any time.209 
Another way that countries work with the strict EU 
requirements is to restrict data flow within a country’s borders.  
Some international cloud service providers have special EU-only 
data clouds that prevent EU data from being transferring outside of 
the EU.210  Under EU data law, individuals have a fundamental 
right to delete or access their personal data.211  This requires cloud 
service providers to communicate effectively with individuals and 
indicate where their data is stored.212 
C. Proposals Moving Forward 
Industry groups, academic scholars, and cloud service 
providers in the United States are divided on how cloud computing 
should be regulated. 
1. Industry-Led Self-Regulation for Cloud Computing 
The Software and Information Industry Association (the 
“SIIA”) and Cloud Security Alliance are the largest groups 
advocating minimal regulation of the cloud computing space.  The 
SIIA comprises 500 software and information companies.213  The 
position of SIIA is that the cloud computing industry should self-
regulate, and the government should not create laws for the 
industry to follow.214  The SIIA wants to “[p]romote open 
 
 209 See id. (“Depending on the industry sector, the Federal Trade Commission, 
comparable U.S. government agencies, and/or states may provide overarching 
government enforcement of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.”). 
 210 SOTTO, supra note 166, at 4. 
 211 Id. at 5. 
 212 See id.; Opinion 05/2012 on Cloud Computing, at 11, WP 196 (July 1, 2012) (stating 
that transparency requires providers to inform individuals of all subcontractors 
“contributing to the provision of the respective cloud service” as well as the location of 
all data centers where personal data is processed). 
 213 Hayley Tsukayama, No Need for Cloud-Specific Legislation, SIIA Industry Group 
Says, The WASH. POST (JULY 26, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/post-tech/post/no-need-for-cloud-specific-legislation-siia-industry-group-says/ 
2011/07/26/gIQAHaEaaI_blog.html. 
 214 See SIIA’s Cloud Computing Recommendations for Policymakers, SOFTWARE & 
INFORMATION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, http://www.siia.net/index.php?option=com_ 
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standards for software and data interoperability, and avoid policies 
that would favor one particular business model or technology over 
another . . . [and] [p]romote policies that allow to the greatest 
extent possible, unrestricted transfer of data across borders.”215 
The SIIA works with the U.S. government, particularly the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, to create open 
standards for privacy and data security under the current “Cloud 
First” policy.216  The Cloud Security Alliance is a group of 
industry practitioners and corporations that work to promote the 
use of best practices for addressing security issues when using 
cloud computing technology.217  The Cloud Security Alliance 
advocates minimal government intrusion.218  Both the CSA and the 
SIIA believe that if one country’s regulations are too restrictive on 
the movement of data and privacy, cloud service providers should 
simply move their data to a different location. 
2. Cloud Computing Needs Regulation and Clarity 
Academic scholars have set forth the view that cloud 
computing regulations are essential to U.S. national security and 
foreign policy interests.219  However, scholars taking this stance 
dispute whether cloud computing should be regulated through the 
manipulation of export controls or through jurisdiction and 
contractual obligations.220  These scholars are concerned that 
flexibility in cloud computing is not worth the uncertainty of the 
 
content&view=article&id=807:siias-cloud-computing-recommendations-for-
policymakers&catid=163:public-policy-articles (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 215 Id. 
 216 See Letter from Ken Wasch, President, Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n, to Dawn 
Leaf, Exec. Program Manager, Cloud Computing, Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech. 
(Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://siia.net/index.php?option=com_docman&task= 
doc_download&gid=3235&Itemid=318. 
 217 About, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/about (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 218 See STAR FAQ, CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE, https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/ 
faq (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) (“In these early days of cloud adoption, voluntary self-
regulation of cloud providers is preferable to heavy handed governmental regulation.”). 
 219 See generally Villasenor, supra note 26, at 1 (discussing why cloud computing 
should be regulated). 
 220 See id. at 1–2 (discussing how issues of jurisdiction related to cloud control have 
been studied, but not enough attention has been given to export control and its 
relationship to cloud computing).  
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location of data in the cloud or the vague contractual terms, unless 
there are strict regulations controlling jurisdiction and contractual 
obligations.221  They consider cloud computing an “immature and 
rapidly-developing market” where there is a “mismatch” between 
consumer expectations and the services consumers receive.222  
Issues with the location of data may create conflicts if the contract 
specifies a foreign legal system and jurisdiction.223 
The Brookings Institute, a nonprofit public research and policy 
organization in Washington, D.C., champions the regulation of 
cloud computing.224  Its Board of Trustees is comprised of 
distinguished representatives from a broad swath of the public, 
including the Chief Investment Officer of Yale University.225  The 
Brookings Institute argues that if no action is taken to regulate 
cloud computing, the government’s failure to regulate may weaken 
the entire U.S. export control system.226 
John Villasenor, senior fellow in Governance Studies at the 
Center for Technology Innovation at Brookings, favors regulation 
in security, privacy and jurisdictional issues.227  Villasenor 
recommends that cloud service providers give users a choice over 
the location of the server storing their data.228  Under this plan, 
users would be able to choose if they want to pay “a slight 
premium to ensure the assignment of servers based in the United 
 
 221 See Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard, & Ian Walden, The Terms They Are A-
Changin’ . . . Watching Cloud Contracts Take Shape, 7 ISSUES IN TECH. INNOVATION 1, 1, 
5–6 (2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/03_cloud_computing_ 
contracts.aspx. 
 222 Id. at 11. 
 223 Id. at 2. 
 224 The goals of the Institute are to “[s]trengthen American democracy . . . .[f]oster the 
economic and social welfare, security and opportunity of all Americans[ and] . . . 
“[s]ecure a more open, safe, prosperous and cooperative international system.” About 
Brookings, BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 
2013). 
 225 See Board of Trustees, BROOKINGS INST., http://www.brookings.edu/about/ 
Trustees.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2012); (“The Brookings Board of Trustees is 
composed of distinguished business executives, academics, former government officials 
and community leaders.”). 
 226 See VILLASENOR, supra note 26, at 10. 
 227 See id. 
 228 See id. at 7. 
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States,” and thus have a more secured server.229  A pricing plan 
may set off the cost to cloud computing technology companies.230 
3. Cloud Computing Service Providers Attempt to Control 
Which Law Governs Their Data Servers 
The Cloud Legal Project at the Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies, based at the School of Law at Queen Mary, University of 
London, conducted a survey of thirty-one cloud computing 
contracts from twenty-seven different providers.231  The study 
found that these contracts mandate that law from various U.S. 
states or English law applied and could force users to defend a suit 
in an unfamiliar place.232  Some countries outside the United States 
do not have the same civil rights safeguards.233  Without legislation 
and policy, users of cloud computing services could be subject to 
arbitrary laws.234 
The surveyed contracts often had exclusion clauses and 
disclaimers buried deep within the contract terms that allow the 
companies to alter these contracts at will.235  For instance, the 
Amazon Web Service Customer Agreement (2011) states, “[w]e 
may modify this Agreement (including any Policies) at any time by 
posting a revised version on the AWS Site . . . . By continuing to 
use the Service Offerings after the effective date of any 
modifications to this Agreement, you agree to be bound by the 
modified terms.”236  Here, Amazon essentially reserves the right to 
 
 229 Id. 
 230 See id. at 7–8. 
 231 See Simon Bradshaw, Christopher Millard, & Ian Walden, Contracts for Clouds: 
Comparison and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, 19 
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 191 (2011).  The survey included the following providers: 
37signals, 3tera, Adrive, Akamai, Amazon, Apple, Decho, Dropbox, ElasticHosts, 
Facebook, Flexiant, G.ho.st, GoGrid, Google, IBM, Iron Mountain, Joyent, Microsoft, 
Nirvanix, PayPal, Rackspace UK, Salesforce, Symantec, The Planet, UKFast, Zecter, and 
Zoho. Id. at 193–94.  The survey was partially funded by Microsoft. Id. at 187 n.*. 
 232 Id. at 198–200. 
 233 Jaeger, supra note 15, at § 5. 
 234 See id. 
 235  Bradshaw, supra note 231, at 9 (“A large portion of the contracts we analyzed 
included terms providing that the provider could amend the contract simply by posting an 
updated version on its web site; if a customer continues to use the service, this is deemed 
acceptance of the new terms.”). 
 236 AWS CUSTOMER AGREEMENT, supra note 125, at § 12. 
C07_SEGALL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  4:06 PM 
1146 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1105 
modify its contract, or the terms governing the location of its data 
servers. 
These technology companies often have terms of service that 
limit liability of the company.237  Terms in Google’s “Google Apps 
for Business Online Agreement” govern requests by third parties to 
access private information:238 
Customer is responsible for responding to Third 
Party Requests.  Google will, to the extent allowed 
by law and by the terms of the Third Party Request: 
(a) promptly notify Customer of its receipt of a 
Third Party Request; (b) comply with Customer’s 
reasonable requests regarding its efforts to oppose a 
Third Party Request; and (c) provide Customer with 
the information or tools required for Customer to 
respond to the Third Party Request.  Customer will 
first seek to obtain the information required to 
respond to the Third Party Request on its own, and 
will contact Google only if it cannot reasonably 
obtain such information.239 
It is unclear if this provision applies to “Google Apps for 
Government.”  These customer agreements often have vague terms 
because the service providers may not know which country’s law 
governs their contracts and whether police enforcement could 
access confidential user data.240 
Public and private companies that provide cloud computing 
services are often unaware of the laws that apply to their data 
 
 237 See, e.g., AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, 
http://aws.amazon.com/serviceterms/ (last updated Mar. 7, 2013) (“We have no liability 
or responsibility with respect to any delay, damage or loss incurred during shipment, 
including loss of Data.”); Google Apps for Business (Online) Agreement, GOOGLE APPS, 
http://www.google.com/apps/intl/en/terms/premier_terms.html (last updated Mar. 28, 
2012) (“Neither party will be liable under this agreement for lost revenues or indirect, 
special, incidental, consequential, exemplary, or punitive damages, even if the party knew 
or should have known that such damages were possible and even if direct damages do not 
satisfy a remedy.”). 
 238 See Google Apps for Business (Online) Agreement, supra note 237. 
 239 Id. 
 240 See BRAD SMITH, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE CLOUD: A PROPOSAL FOR INDUSTRY 
AND GOVERNMENT ACTION TO ADVANCE CLOUD COMPUTING 7. 
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servers or the information they contain.  A Microsoft memo on 
building the cloud industry observed, 
There are, however, no universally agreed upon 
rules governing such access by law enforcement.  
The result is that service providers are increasingly 
subject to divergent, and at times conflicting, rules 
governing jurisdiction over user content and data.  
Further complicating the problem is the fact that 
different jurisdictions also have different laws 
regarding privacy rights and data retention.241 
These conflicting messages make it difficult for cloud service 
providers to meet consumer expectations for competent privacy 
and security protections.242 
D. Potential Conflicts if the Government Does Establish Uniform 
Regulation 
There are many loopholes in the U.S. government’s approach 
to regulating cloud computing technology.  The GAO has 
identified a number of negative security implications that would 
occur if the government continues to neglect regulation of the 
cloud computing industry.243  Twenty-two of twenty-four major 
federal agencies reported that they were “concerned or very 
concerned about the potential information security risks associated 
with cloud computing.”244 
If sensitive U.S. government data is sitting in countries that 
abide by the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, local police 
may have access to private government information.245  Access 
 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. (“This global thicket of competing and conflicting laws presents a significant 
obstacle to the delivery of cloud services that meet users’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy.”). 
 243 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-130T, Information Security: 
Additional Guidance Needed to Address Cloud Computing Concerns 6–7 (2011), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-130T (“The use of cloud computing 
can also create numerous information security risks for federal agencies. . . . Several of 
these risks relate to being dependent on a vendor’s security assurances and practices.”). 
 244 Id. at 6. 
 245 See Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 152, at art. 19(1) (“Each Party shall 
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent 
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may be necessary in certain emergency situations such a data 
server meltdown, but the Budapest Convention mandates a low 
standard for abridging private rights.246 
Another potential problem is that government contracts with 
private companies often do not include terms dictating the location 
of the data servers that hold their information.  With choice of law 
provisions unclear as to whether a data server implicates a legal 
interest, it is difficult to determine what law would apply overseas 
in a security breach of a server.  Contractual provisions could solve 
this problem, but private companies currently have full discretion 
to change their terms at any point.247 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The federal government must have absolute control over the 
storage of its electronic information, including the ability to select 
safe countries to host this information and the right to determine 
the frequency with which private and public data service providers 
can move the government’s information to different servers. 
A. Cloud Computing Regulations Will Secure Government 
Information 
Some scholars have found that the main reason for the lack of 
cloud computing regulations in the United States is a “lack of a 
political infrastructure that reacts deftly to rapid technological 
 
authorities to search or similarly access: (a) a computer or part of it and computer data 
stored therein; and (b) a computer-data storage medium in which computer data may be 
stored, in its territory.”). 
 246 See id. at art. 19(2) (“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to ensure that where its authorities search or similarly access a specific 
computer system or part of it, pursuant to paragraph 1.a, and have grounds to believe that 
the data sought is stored in another computer system or party of it in its territory, and 
such data is lawfully accessible from or available to the initial system, the authorities 
shall be able to expeditiously extend the search or similar accessing to the other 
system.”). 
 247 Bradshaw, supra note 231, at 9 (“A large portion of the contracts we analyzed 
included terms providing that the provider could amend the contract simply by posting an 
updated version on its web site; if a customer continues to use the service, this is deemed 
acceptance of the new terms.”). 
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change.”248  The transmission of sensitive government information 
to data servers around the world creates an urgent need for broad 
directives to protect our private information from unwarranted 
intrusions.  In a cloud computing environment, the owner of data 
loses control to a third party company that chooses the storage 
location of the owner’s data.249  The United States needs 
regulations, similar to EU data directives, to protect private 
government information.  When data is stored in other countries, 
these types of regulations are vital in preventing other countries 
from conducting arbitrary server inspections or claiming a right to 
access to the actual data stored on each server. 
With increasing frequency, private companies that offer cloud 
computing services are reporting breaches of security.  It is 
estimated that U.S. businesses and institutions lose sixty-seven 
billion dollars to cybercrime every year.250  Microsoft has admitted 
that, “the aggregation of massive amounts of data in large 
datacenters also creates a new and highly tempting target for 
criminals.  As criminals turn their attention to these vaults of 
information . . . it will become increasingly challenging to protect 
such datacenters from both physical and cyber attacks.”251  The 
prospect of attacks on the countries—as well as the physical 
location of data servers—makes information protection a major 
concern. 
The U.S. government must act to prevent foreign countries 
accessing data servers sitting on their territories from 
circumventing U.S. law.252 
 
 248 Jaeger et al., supra note 15, at § 6. 
 249 Irion, supra note 79, at 9. 
 250 Twelfth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 
Salvador, Braz., Apr. 12–19, 2010, Recent Developments in the Use of Science and 
Technology by Offenders and by Competent Authorities in Fighting Crime, Including the 
Case of Cybercrime, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.213/9 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crime-congress/12th-Crime-
Congress/Documents/A_CONF.213_9/V1050382e.pdf. 
 251 SMITH, supra note 240, at 2. 
 252 See id. (“For the cloud to deliver on its promise, Congress needs to take responsible 
action to foster users’ confidence that their privacy interests will be preserved and their 
data will remain secure in the cloud.”). 
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B. One Way to Ensure the Security of Government Information is 
for the Government to Purchase its own Private Data Centers 
The U.S. government should explore the option of building its 
own private data servers on U.S. soil.  As the government has 
saved significant capital storing its data on server farms, some of 
these reserves should be used towards securing this information.  
One way to ensure that one’s property is completely secure is to 
safeguard that property oneself.  If it were not for the digitization 
of data, the U.S. Government would never think to outsource the 
storage of hard copy files. 
To obtain this high level of security, the government should 
build its own private data centers.  The government is currently the 
largest property owner in the U.S., holding 1.2 million individual 
properties.253  Much of this property is either empty or 
underutilized, and the Obama Administration categorizes this 
property as “excess.”254  These excess properties cost American 
taxpayers an estimated “$190 million a year.”255  Although it 
would be costly to develop the software infrastructure needed, the 
government could contract out services to technology companies, 
but require that the information is stored on its property. 
C. If it is Not Feasible for the Government to Own its Own Data 
Centers, Data Servers Containing Private Government 
Information Should Remain in the United States 
If it is not feasible for the government to build its own data 
servers because the program would be too costly or time 
consuming, the government should mandate that data centers 
storing its information remain in the U.S. 
U.S. cities have lead this initiative.  For example, the City of 
Los Angeles (“LA”) contracts out e-mail service and data storage 
 
 253 Cutting Costs by Getting Rid of Buildings We Don’t Need, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/fiscal/excess-property-map (last visited Mar. 20, 
2013); Jared A. Favole, Uncle Sam Finds 14,000 Facilities to Sell, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 
2011, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/03/02/uncle-sam-finds-14000-
facilities-to-sell. 
 254 See id. 
 255 Id. 
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to Google.256  In LA’s contract with Google, LA requires that e-
mail data be stored and processed only in data servers in the 
continental U.S.257  However, Google does not have enough data 
server capacity in the U.S. to store both e-mail and other data.258  
LA requires notice from Google when space in Google’s U.S. data 
server’s becomes available, so LA can migrate non-e-mail data to 
Google’s U.S. servers.259  While most LA city employees use 
Gmail for e-mail, the LAPD cannot use Google services because 
the data servers that run Google Apps for Government are located 
in the EU.260  Google cannot require EU employees, who run 
Google’s international data servers, to submit to background 
checks to meet the standards of the LAPD.261  If the U.S. 
government were to stand behind LA’s decision, cloud computing 
service providers would have to create more secure U.S.-based 
data servers. 
 
 256 See David Sarno, L.A. Won’t Put LAPD on Google’s Cloud-Based Email System, 
L.A. Times (Dec. 14, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/14/business/la-fi-
google-email-20111215. 
 257 Contract Number C-116359, Between the City of Los Angeles and Computer 
Science Corporation for the SaaS E-Mail and Collaboration Solution (SECS) § 1.7 (Nov. 
10, 2009), available at http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2009/C-116359_c_11-20-
09.pdf, Appendix J.1, Section 1.7 of the Professional Services Contract between Google 
and the City of Los Angeles (“Google agrees to store and process Customer’s email and 
Google Message Discovery (GMD) data only in the continental United States.  As soon 
as it shall become commercially feasible, Google shall store and process all other 
Customer Data, from any other Google Apps applications, only in the continental United 
States.  Google shall make commercially reasonable efforts to advise Customer when 
such data storage capability is made available. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Google 
may store and process Login Data in any country in which Google or its agents maintain 
facilities.”). 
 258 See Sarno, supra note 256 (“Google may have overestimated its ability to satisfy 
strict federal security rules about sensitive data from law enforcement agencies. . . . [T]he 
rules were written for law enforcement agencies that store their own data and did not 
consider the increasingly popular cloud computing model.”). 
 259 Contract Number C-116359, supra note 257, at § 1.7. 
 260 See Jeff Gould, Los Angeles Pulling the Plug on Gmail at LAPD is Much Bigger 
than You Think, SAFEGOV (Dec. 15, 2011), http://safegov.org/2011/12/15/los-angeles-
pulling-the-plug-on-gmail-at-lapd-is-much-bigger-than-you-think (“[A]nalyst firm 
Gartner reported in July that some of Google’s support staff with access to [Google Apps 
for Government] servers are based on Europe.”);  
 261 See id. (“The FBI doesn’t explicitly mandate that support personnel be located in the 
U.S., but European law may make it difficult for Google to force its European employees 
to submit to screening (including fingerprinting) by U.S. authorities.”). 
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It is also important that the U.S. government move away from 
the idea that cloud computing regulations “restrict free trade.”262  
The OMB and the USTR must recognize that these regulations are 
in place to secure private government and consumer data.  As 
discussed earlier, many countries around the world restrict the flow 
of data to within their borders; there is no reason the United States 
should not also adopt this policy. 
In addition to the proposition that government information 
must remain in the U.S., broad regulations governing contracts 
with private parties are necessary to achieve security through the 
cloud computing agenda.  NIST is one of the only agencies that 
has comprehensively thought about the different requirements for 
the various cloud computing platforms.263  NIST has also 
considered the interdependency of the U.S. government’s cloud 
computing program with other cyber security and national security 
initiatives.264  The problem is that NIST lacks the authority to 
regulate other government agencies and only has the authority to 
create a roadmap or guidance document.265  It is important that 
Congress delegate the authority to develop a plan to protect 
government information. 
The uncoordinated U.S. approach contrasts starkly with the 
pool of countries that have developed comprehensive cloud 
computing laws.  The United States is supposed to be a global 
technology leader, but among most developed countries, the 
 
 262 Technosource Info. Servs., LLC, B-405296 et al., Comp. Gen. (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/405296.pdf. 
 263 See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 1 
(2011), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800-145.pdf 
(“The intended audience of this document is system planners, program managers, 
technologists, and others adopting cloud computing as consumers or providers of cloud 
services.”). 
 264 LEE BADGER, TIM GRANCE, ROBERT PATT-CORNER, & JEFF VOAS, CLOUD 
COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ES-2, 1-1 (2012), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-146/sp800-146.pdf. 
 265 Id. at 1-1 (“Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and 
guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of 
Commerce under statutory authority, nor should these guidelines be interpreted as 
altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of 
the OMB, or any other Federal official.”).  
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United States has the least cohesive security plans regulating cloud 
computing technology. 
CONCLUSION 
No government agency has comprehensively looked at all of 
the risks concerning cloud computing technology, and the law of 
countries where data servers are located.  As the government 
increasingly moves sensitive data to private companies that are 
free to store information in massive data servers overseas, U.S. 
citizens face countless threats to their privacy and the security of 
their data.  The government must at least attempt to keep its own 
information on U.S. soil.  If this is not feasible, data servers 
containing sensitive government information must at least remain 
in the United States. 
 
